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BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
This appeal was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court on April 19, 1993, thus
empowering this court to decide this matter under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). However
appellee challenges this court's jurisdiction to hear this appeal based on the untimely filing of the
July 14, 1993 notice of appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue One: Whether, despite the trial court's grant of an extension under UTAH R. APP.
P. 4(e) in which to file a notice of appeal, this court has jurisdiction to decide this matter.
Standard Of Review: To the extent this issue requires this court's interpretation of its
own rules, there is no standard of review. To the extent, however, it requires an analysis of an

1

order of the trial court, there are two possible standards of review. The trial court's grant of an
extension in which to file a notice of appeal is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard.
UTAH

R. APP. P. 4(e). The trial court's interpretation of rule 4(e), however, is a question of law,

invoking a correction of error standard. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1993).
Issue Two: Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to defendantappellee Todd Crosland (appellee Crosland) based on the application of UTAH CODE ANN. §1610-139 (section 139) to the undisputed facts of this case.
Standard Of Review: Correction of error. Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1192.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 16-10-139 is the primary determinative statute in this matter. This section
provides in full as follows:
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall be
jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a
result thereof.
Sections 16-10-88.2(1), (2)(d) are also determinative in this matter. These subsections
provide as follows:
(1) A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days
after the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under Section 59-7155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, unless the
corporation's certificate of incorporation is already suspended for any reason. A
corporation that is suspended continues its corporate existence and may carry on
any business so long as it also takes the necessary steps to remedy its suspended
status and restore the corporation to good standing.
(2)

A notice of suspension shall state:

* ***

2

(d) that the corporation may remove the suspension by correcting
the delinquency and paying a reinstatement fee determined by the division
pursuant to Subsection 63-38-3(2), or, if its certificate of incorporation has been
suspended under Section 59-7-155, by complying with the provisions of Section
59-7-157...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

This is an action on a promissory note on which defendant

Crosland Industries, Inc. ("CI") was a guarantor. Having been unsuccessful in recovering from
CI, appellants endeavored to impose personal liability for the note on appellee Crosland and
other principals of CI.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The amended complaint was filed on
June 4, 1990. The court granted summary judgment against defendant Jeff Crosland on March
26, 1991. The court granted summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs' claims in favor of appellee
Todd Crosland on November 13, 1992. Appellants have brought this appeal from the judgment
in favor of appellee Todd Crosland. Jeff Crosland has appealed the summary judgment against
him, and the two appeals have been consolidated.
On July 2, 1993, appellee Crosland filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the
original notice of appeal was premature and that no subsequent notice had been filed as required
by UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(a). While that motion was pending, appellants obtained from the trial court
an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal. That motion was brought after the initial
time for appeal had expired. Appellee Crosland opposed that motion. Pursuant to the court's
order, appellants filed a notice of appeal on July 14, 1993. This court then denied appellee
Crosland's motion to dismiss the appeal based on that July 14 notice of appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Crosland Industries, Inc. ("CI") was lawfully incorporated on January

28, 1986, under the laws of the State of Utah and was issued a Certificate of Incorporation. (R.
at 269.)
2.

Defendant Todd Crosland ("Todd Crosland") was the president, a director, and a

principal shareholder of CI. (R. at 210.)
3.

On March 1, 1987, CI was suspended pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10-

88.2. (R. at 210.)
4.

On January 8, 1988, plaintiffs Brian and Shelly Murphy (the "Murphys") entered

into a contract of purchase and sale with Arnold Swenson ("Swenson") by which Swenson
agreed to purchase from the Murphys a business known as Granny's Bums, which was located in
Las Vegas, Nevada. The agreed purchase price was $70,000. (R. at 210.)
5.

Swenson executed a promissory note in favor of the Murphys in the amount of

$70,000 and a Security Agreement. (R. at 210.)
6.

Defendant Jeff Crosland was the vice president and a director of CI. On January

8, 1988, Jeff Crosland signed a guaranty of the Note in his representative capacity on behalf of
CI. (R. at 210.)
7.

On March 1, 1988, CI was dissolved as a corporation under the laws of the state

of Utah (R. at 210.)
8.

Swenson defaulted on the note and on the purchase contract. (R. 82, 15-16.)

9.

On July 27, 1989, the Murphys obtained a default judgment against CI based on

its guaranty in the amount of $72,987.46, plus interest at the rate often percent (10%) per year.
(R. 49, 111.)
10.

The Murphys brought this action on February 27, 1988. (R. 2.) An amended

complaint was filed on June 11, 1988. (R. 45.)
4

11.

On March 26, 1991, by way of minute entry, the trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of the Murphys and against Jeff Crosland based c

JTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10-

139. (R. 174.) The court denied summary judgment against Todd Crosland. (R. 178.)
12.

On October 14, 1992, Todd Crosland filed a motion for summary judgment as to

each of the Murphys' five causes of action. (R. 206-07.) The Murphys conceded summary
judgment as to the second through the fifth causes of action. (R. 249.) On November 13, 1992,
the court entered summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland dismissing the Murphys1 claims
against him. (R. at 314.) The Murphys sought reconsideration of that decision on December 3,
1992.

(R. at 332.)

The court declined to reverse itself and entered an order denying

reconsideration on February 18, 1993. (R. at 397.) At that time, the claims against Jeff Crosland
had not been reduced to judgment. Judgment against Jeff Crosland was entered on March 9,
1993. (R. at 418.)
13.

On February 22, 1993, the Murphys were granted an extension in which to file a

notice of appeal as to the order granting summary judgment to Todd Crosland. (R. at 399.)
14.

On March 8, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed an objection to the proposed form of

judgment against him. (R. at 403.) On March 19, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed a motion to amend
that judgment or for a new trial under UTAH R. CIV. P. 59. (R. at 425.)
15.

On March 18, 1993, the Murphys filed a notice of appeal as to the summary

judgment in favor of Todd Crosland. (R. at 423.)
16.

On April 8, 1993, counsel for Todd Crosland wrote to plaintiffs' counsel

informing him that the notice of appeal as to the summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland
was premature. Counsel was informed that it would be necessary for him to dismiss the appeal.
(R. at 505.)
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17.

On May 25, 1993, the court entered its order denying Jeff Crosland's rule 59

motion to amend judgment or for a new trial, thus disposing of this matter in its entirety. (R. at
464.)
18.

The time for filing a notice of appeal following the court's May 25th denial of Jeff

Crosland's motion expired on June 24, 1993. Plaintiffs did not dismiss the premature appeal
filed on March 24th; nor did they file a notice of appeal from the court's May 25th order. (R. at
495.)
19.

On July 2, 1993, Todd Crosland filed in this court a motion to dismiss this appeal

on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the March 18, 1993 notice of appeal was premature and
did not confer jurisdiction on this court and that no new notice had been filed within thirty days
after the entry of the May 25, 1993 order denying Jeff Crosland's rule 59 motion.
20.

On July 7, 1993, appellants filed with the trial court a motion to extend the time in

which to file a notice of appeal under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (R.
475.)
21.

On July 14, 1993, the trial court granted an extension of time in which to file a

notice of appeal, and appellants filed a notice that day. (R. 519, 521.)
22.

On August 4, 1993, this court denied appellee Crosland's motion to dismiss based

on the trial court's July 14 extension of time.
23.

In granting the additional time in which to file a notice of appeal, the trial court

found specifically that there was no excusable neglect within the meaning of rule 4(e), but
granted the additional time on the basis of "good cause." (R. 519.)

fs

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

APPELLANTS' JULY 14, 1993 NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS INVALIDLY
FILED BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF
UTAH R. APP. P. 4(E),
This court is without jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The July 14, 1993 notice of

appeal that brought appellants to this court was improperly filed. After observing that there was
no excusable neglect for the failure to file a timely notice, the court applied an incorrect "good
cause" standard. A showing of good cause will support an extension of time in which to file, but
only if the request is made prior to the running of the first thirty days in which to appeal.
Appellants sought their extension well after that period had lapsed. As a result, the only
available basis for the extension was excusable neglect. Absent a showing of excusable neglect
to support it, the July 14, 1993 notice of appeal is incapable of invoking this court's jurisdiction.
II.

TODD CROSLAND IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY
OBLIGATIONS TO APPELLANTS BY REASON OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-139
The trial court was entirely correct in granting summary judgment to appellee Crosland.

The court recognized that UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-139 was enacted for one purpose only - to
abolish the doctrine of de facto incorporation. CI was a de jure corporation from its inception
until its dissolution. Because CI was a dejure corporation at the time of the acts complained of,
section 139 does not apply to impose personal liability on Todd Crosland.
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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS1 JULY 14, 1993 NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS INVALIDLY
FILED BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF
UTAH R. APP. P. 4(E).
A.

When Made Before the Initial time for Appeal has run, a Request for
Additional Time in Which to file a Notice of Appeal is Addressed under
a Good Cause Standard Only.

Rule 4(e) permits additional time for the filing of a notice of appeal "upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause . . . ." (emphasis added). The good cause test is distinct from
the excusable neglect test and applies only when the rule 4(e) request is made before the initial
thirty-day appeal time has run.
The phrase "or good cause" was added by the amendment of [1979]. The
Committee Note indicates that while excusable neglect remains an appropriate
standard when the motion is made after the initial appeal time has run, it never fit
exactly the situation in which the appellant seeks extension of the time before the
initial time to appeal has expired, since at the time he requests the extension he
has not neglected to do anything the rules require him to do.
9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f204.13[l.-2], at 4-98 (2d ed. 1993).
"Although

[FED.

R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)] (virtually identical to UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(e)) allows an

extension of time upon a showing of excusable neglect or 'good cause,' the latter is applicable only
where a motion is filed before the extension of the thirty-day period." State of Oregon v.
Champion International Corporation, 680 F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). See also ParkeChapley Construction Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 909-10 (7th Cir. 1989); Marsh v.
Richardson, 873 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1989).1
1

The court in Cherrington observed that three of the four circuits that had at that time considered this question
agreed that the standard depends on the timing of the motion. Those decisions were Champion International, 680
F.2d 1300, In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1032 (1985) and
Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Larson, ill F.2d 916 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert, denied 484 U.S. 1032 (1988).
Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1986) is alone in rejecting that application of the good cause-excusable
neglect standard, and then only in dicta. See Cherrington, 865 F.2d at 910. The First Circuit's well-intentioned
effort to right a wrong in Scarpa, where the post office was the cause for a late notice of appeal, set it on an

8

For the "good cause" amendment to make any sense, therefore, rule 4(e) means that a
request for additional time made before the time for appeal has run is based on a showing of good
cause, which is a less stringent standard. A request made after the time has run must satisfy the
excusable neglect test.
B.

Appellants were Improperly Allowed to file the July 14, 1993 Notice of
Appeal In That The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Applying a
Good Cause Standard.

An abuse of discretion occurs when the court either misapplies or ignores the applicable
law. Brown v. Johnson, All P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1970); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134
(Utah App. 1990). In this case, the standard governing appellants' request for additional time
was excusable neglect. Appellee argued that rule 4(b) required appellants to file a new notice of
appeal within thirty days after the disposition of Jeff Crosland's rule 59 motion. The rule
provides as follows:
"[T]he time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order
[disposing of a motion under rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59]. A notice of appeal filed
incorrect course in its construction of rule 4(a)(5). The First Circuit has since made this statement: "[T]he good
cause analysis imported under the 1979 amendment neither displaces nor overlaps the "excusable neglect" analysis
customarily employed under the earlier rule" [which employed only an excusable neglect standard]. Pontarelli v.
Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). Strangely, the court then cited Lorenzen v. Employees Ret. Plan ofSperry
& Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1990) for that court's proposition that "the standards of excusable
neglect and of good cause will rarely if ever have to be compared, because they have different domains." Yet
Lorenzen held that good cause applies only where the extension is sought before the first thirty days expires. Thus,
the First Circuit has confused the substance of the standards, which are continuing to develop (with most courts
agreeing that excusable neglect is a more difficult test), with the timing requirements of the motion itself. In other
words, if good cause and excusable neglect mean the same thing, then the debate is moot. However, statutes are not
interpreted the way the First Circuit has interpreted rule 4(a)(5). The rule's use of the word "or" and the advisory
committee's effort to address the timing issue by creating a different standard demonstrate that the two standards are
different~that they indeed occupy "different domains." They are different because they depend on the timing of the
motion. The vast majority of courts apply them differently, demanding a strong showing before excusable neglect
will be found. Marsh, 873 F.2d at 130; Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 808
F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1987); Borio v. Coastal Marine Construction Co., 881 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1989).
Any other reading of the rule blots out one standard or the other. Cf. Commercial Building Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d
776,778 (Utah 1977); Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 795 P.2d 1006, 1010 (N.M. 1990) (use of the term "or" in a statute
requires "normal disjunctive reading unless the context of a statute demands otherwise," meaning that the term on
each side of the disjunctive be interpreted by itself).

9

before the disposition of any [such motion] shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the
order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above."
UTAHR.APP. P. 4(b).

An attack on a judgment renders all prior notices of appeal ineffective. U-M Investments
v. Ray, 658 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982) (construing former appellate rule 73(a)). The time for appeal
'for all parties'9 begins to run anew following the disposition of a rule 59 motion. Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) ("A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon [an
appellate court.]") (emphasis added).2
After appellants sought to reduce their claim against Jeff Crosland to judgment, Jeff
Crosland responded with a rule 59 motion on March 19, 1993. (R. 425.) Appellants had filed a
notice of appeal as to the summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland one day earlier on March
18th. (R. 423.) The court denied the rule 59 motion on May 25, 1993. (R. 464.) The time for
filing a notice of appeal thus began to run on May 25th and lapsed on June 24th. Appellants did
not file a notice of appeal during that period. Importantly, counsel for appellee Crosland notified

2

"Finality of a judgment is suspended upon timely filing of a post-judgment motion under Rule 4(b), and the time
for appeal does not commence until final disposition of that motion." Hafen, 723 P.2d at 426, citing Bailey v. Sound
Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984); State Bank of Beaver County v. Mortensen, 241 P. 1055, 1057 (Utah 1925);
5 A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 52.11 [3], at 52-199 (1986). Indeed, even a notice of appeal filed after a ruling
on a rule 59 motion but before the order is actually entered is ineffective, and a new notice of appeal must be filed.
Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 100 (Utah App. 1988). This requirement is probably linked to the
language of rule 54(b), which allows a non final order to be revised prior to the entry of an order or judgment
disposing of all of the claims and all of the parties. As Judge Orme explained in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42,44 (Utah App. 1988), "Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior rulings in complex
cases as subsequent developments in the case might suggest, unless those rulings disposed of entire claims or parties
and those rulings were specifically certified as final." A party, having filed a notice of appeal based on a ruling that
is later modified as a result of "subsequent developments," may see the basis for the appeal disappear because of the
modification of the order. Rule 4(b) ensures that an appellant will have to revisit the basis for the appeal by filing a
new notice following a ruling on a post-judgment motion that may have impacted the order from which the appeal
was taken. Cf Century Laminating Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 566-67 (10th Cir. 1979) (a post judgment
motion renders that judgment non-final).
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appellants through counsel that the March 18 notice of appeal was premature. (R. 505.) Still, no
new notice was filed following the denial of the rule 59 motion.
On June 29, 1993, appellee Crosland filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, and on July
7th, appellants brought their motion in the trial court for an extension in which to file a notice of
appeal. (R. 475.) Therefore, having made their request after the initial time to appeal had run,
appellants were subject to an excusable neglect standard, and the trial court expressly found that
there was no excusable neglect. (R. 519.)3 The trial court abused its discretion by applying an
incorrect good cause standard and granting the additional time in which to appeal. As a result,
the July 14 notice of appeal was ineffective to confer jurisdiction on this court.4
II.

TODD CROSLAND IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY
OBLIGATIONS TO APPELLANTS BY REASON OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-139.5
A.

Section 139 was Enacted only to Abolish de facto Corporations.

Legislative intent, that "guiding principle of statutory construction," controls the
application of a statute. Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 371 (Colo. 1986); Savage Industries,
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991). A court is constrained to apply
a statute so as to further its purpose. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991);
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984).

Further, the legislature

presumptively considers other, related statutes when it enacts a given provision, Murray City v.
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), and the statutes must be construed together where possible.
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980). Correlatively, part of a larger
3

The trial court deleted from the order the language referring to excusable neglect (R. 519), having expressly
found that there was none.
4
This court relied on the July 14 notice when denying Todd Crosland's motion to dismiss the appeal.
5
This section, along with the entire Business Corporation Act, was repealed and replaced with the Revised
Business Corporation Act after the accrual of appellants' claims. See Laws 1992, Ch. 277 § 248, effective July 1,
1992. The present provisions appear in the Revised Business Corporation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-101, et
seq., effective July 1, 1992. The former provisions, however, govern this action. UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-5.
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legislative act is interpreted so as to harmonize with the entire act. Jensen v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10-139 provides as follows: "All persons who assume to act as a

corporation without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof."

This portion of the former Business

Corporation Act was intended to abolish the doctrine of de facto corporations.6 Section 139 was
intended to ensure that any conduct ostensibly corporate but that lacked the authority of a
certificate of incorporation could not be attributed to a common law de facto entity.
This section is designed to prohibit the application of any theory of de
facto incorporation. The only authority to act as a corporation under the Model
Act arises form completion of the procedures prescribed in §§ 53 to 55, inclusive.
[§§ 16-10-48, 49 and 50, U.C.A. 1953, as enacted 1961.] The consequences of
those procedures are specified in § 56 [§ 16-10-51] as being the creation of a
corporation. No other means being authorized, the effect of [section 139] is to
negate the possibility of a de facto corporation.
Abolition of the concept of de facto incorporation, which at best was
fuzzy, is a sound result. No reason exists for its continuance under general
corporate laws, for the process of acquiring de jure incorporation is both simple
and clear. The vestigial appendage should be removed.
2

MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED,

§ 146, at 908-09 (2d ed. 1971), quoted in

Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163, 165-66 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J.
dissenting). See also Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 525 P.2d 135 (Ore. 1974);
Micciche, 727 P.2d 367. "[A] de facto corporation cannot exist under the Model Act." 2 MODEL
ACT at 205. Since the enactment of section 139, anything short of full compliance with sections
16-10-48, 49 and 50 is meaningless. Corporate existence thus depends entirely on the issuance

6

A de facto corporation existed at common law where there was a bona fide but defective or incomplete attempt to
incorporate and the would-be incorporators had done business as a corporation. See Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n., 407 P.2d 683, 684 (Utah 1965). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 308 (5th ed. 1979).
1?

of a certificate of incorporation. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-51. See 1 MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED

§ 2.04 comment at 135-36 (3d ed. 1985) (issuance of certificate

of incorporation is sole indicator of corporate existence).
Section 139 was first applied in Ipson, 567 P.2d 163. In that case, Ipson signed a contract
as president of "Bonneville Raceways." Id. at 164. There was no such corporation, but Ipson did
claim to be the president of a defunct Nevada corporation called "Bonneville Raceways Park."
This entity apparently did business in Utah under the name M.S.J. & Associates, which was a
Utah corporation. With matter-of-fact reasoning, the court held that under these circumstances,
section 139 imposed personal liability:
It also appears that in signing the paper as he did, Ipson left himself
obligated for there was no corporation named Bonneville Raceways of which he
was president in Utah; and Ipson claims that the defunct Nevada corporation
named Bonneville Raceways Park (not Bonneville Raceways as he signed) did
business in Utah under the name of another corporation [M.S.J.], a Utah
corporation.
By signing the agreement as he did, Mr. Ipson made himself liable even if
it had been an original obligation because there was no such corporation of which
he was president, (cf. Sec. 16-10-139, U.C.A. 1953, as amended).
567 P.2d at 164-65.
The couifs reasoning in Ipson is true to the intent of section 139. Had Mr. Ipson signed
the agreement as a representative of Bonneville Raceways Park instead of Bonneville Raceways,
then the outcome might have been different (as urged by Justice Maughanfs dissent). Without a
certificate of incorporation empowering Bonneville Raceways with de jure status, Ipson had no
authority to sign for an entity by that name. Because there was no de jure status, there was no
authority to act in a corporate capacity.
Shortly after Ipson, the Utah Supreme Court again applied section 139 in Sterling Press
v. Pettit, 580 P.2d 599 (Utah 1978). In Pettit, a corporation known as ILC endeavored to form a
13

new entity called Investor's Publishing Company to publish a magazine, but did not register the
publishing company with the secretary of state as a trade name of ILC. ILC did open a bank
account in the name of Investor's Publishing Company. After a check signed by the individual
defendants was twice dishonored, plaintiff brought suit. Two months after the action was filed,
Investor's Publishing Company was finally registered as a trade name of ILC.
Invoking section 139, Justice Maughan, writing this time for a unanimous court, observed
that the dishonored check contained only the names of the individual defendants and the
unregistered trade name. The court held that "[defendants were assuming corporate powers
without authority by using the unregistered [trade name] and hence are liable for the debts of that
company." Id. at 600. Cf McLean Bank v. Nelson, 350 S.E.2d 651 (Va. 1986) (de jure status
retains separate existence of corporation and shareholders.
Just as in Ipson, section 139 was triggered in Pettit because there was no de jure entity.
Ipson and Pettit are precisely the kind of situations for which section 139 was designed. Unless
the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-48, 49 and 50 have been satisfied and a
certificate of incorporation issued, it is impossible to create an agency relationship, and the
individuals attempting to do so are personally liable. See also Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d
870 (10th Cir. 1982). Cf. Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 187 P.174 (Utah
1919) (authority of officer to act on behalf of corporation "die[s] with the corporation.").
B.

Suspension does not Affect a Corporation fs de facto Status and thus
does not Trigger Section 139.

The life of a corporation is purely statutory.

Once formed under the Business

Corporation Act, the entity takes on a dejure existence, which ends only after dissolution. UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 16-10-100, 101. Failure to file an annual report, for example, leads first to

delinquency, id. at § 16-10-88.1 and then, if not cured, to suspension, and ultimately to
dissolution. Id. at § 16-10-88.2(1), (4). Nowhere in the process of corporate death is the entity
14

stripped of its de jure status until the winding up process during dissolution is complete. See
M&S Construction & Engineering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 467 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1970)
(suspended corporation retains capacity to sue in corporate capacity);
CORPORATIONS,

FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA

§ 8172, at 432 (perm. ed. 1979 rev. vol.).

In Micciche, 727 P.2d 367, the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to apply COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-3-104, which is identical to Utah's section 139, to impose personal liability on a
corporate officer for obligations incurred by the corporation while it was suspended. Looking
first to legislative intent as the "guiding principle of statutory construction," the court observed
that § 104 was adopted as part of Colorado's Business Corporation Act and was included to
"make the issuance of a certificate of incorporation the sole determinant of corporate existence,
thereby eliminating the doctrine of de facto incorporation." Id. at 370.
Noting that if "the legislature had intended § 104 to apply to officers of a validly formed
but suspended corporation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have made its intent . . .
clear," the court limited § 104 to "those instances when persons act as a corporation without
making any bona fide effort to achieve corporate status by complying with the statutory
requirements for incorporation." Id. at 372. Thus, § 104 was not available to impose personal
liability where there was a de jure corporation even though that corporation was suspended.
Accord, Creditors Protective Ass'n., Inc. v. Baksay, 573 P.2d 766 (Ore. App. 1978) (Oregon
version of § 16-10-139, substantially the same as Utah's, does not impose personal liability for
conduct while dejure corporation is suspended).7
7

In a similar vein, once the dissolution process begins, and the corporation is required to wind up its affairs, it may
incur debts in doing so. "Included in the powers which a dissolved corporation may exercise during the period
given it by statute for closing up its affairs is that of settling and adjusting debts and claims by and against it." 16 A.
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, § 8172, at 432 (perm. ed. 1979 rev. vol.). As a result, "[i]t is within the

power of the corporation to give a note for a debt which existed before the dissolution. . . . " Id It follows that
"[w]here an officer signs a promissory note in the corporate name after dissolution, and the note represents a debt
which was incurred prior to dissolution, the officer does not become personally liable for the money owed." Id at
67 (1986 Supp.). The Business Corporation Act cannot be read to require and allow officers and directors to wind
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When asked to apply a provision nearly identical to section 139, the Oregon Court of
Appeals recognized the rather narrow intent of the provision.

In Creditors Protective

Association, Inc. v. Baksay, 573 P.2d 766 (Ore. App. 1978), plaintiff brought an action against a
corporation's president to recover the price for goods purchased while the corporation was
suspended. Plaintiffs claims rested on two related theories. Plaintiff argued first that the
suspension ended the corporation's right to transact business and that personal liability then
flowed through to the president. Plaintiff also argued that Oregon's version of section 139 also
imposed personal liability in this situation.
The court observed, however, that although "the right of the corporation to transact
business is deemed to be in abeyance and shall be suspended," ORS § 57.779(3), there was no
express or implied intent in the statutes to "invest corporate creditors with a right of action
against individual officers." 573 P.2d at 768. "Absent clear evidence of legislative intent to
create personal liability, such statutes have not been held to interrupt the existence of delinquent
corporations so as to render its members liable as partners. Rather, they have been construed as
affecting only the corporation's right to enforce contracts during the period of its delinquency."
Id, citing 16A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, 60, n. 63 (1962).
In Utah, dejure status remains unaffected by suspension (and even dissolution during the
winding up period) Mackay & Knobel, 460 P.2d at 829 ("the term 'suspension' itself imparts a
temporary restriction of function of the corporation, the meaning of which is something less than
the termination of the corporate life as brought about by dissolution"). See also Bank ofAmerica
National Trust and Savings Association v. Morse, 508 P.2d 194 (Ore. 1973) (suspension does not
affect corporate existence). See also United States v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561

up the affairs of a dissolved corporation, which includes settling claims against the corporation, Mackay & Knobel
Enterprises, Inc v Teton Van Gas, Inc, 460 P.2d, 828, 829 (Utah 1969), and at the same time impose personal
liability on them for doing so. That conflict would exist if appellants' reading of section 139 were adopted.
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F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1977); Tagliani v. Colwell, 517 P.2d 207 (Wash. App. 1973) (section 139 does
not impose personal liability unless the corporation has ceased altogether to exist); Loveridge v.
Dragoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982). Cf. Clark-Franklin-Kingston Press, Inc. v. Romano,
529 A.2d 240 (Conn. App. 1987), cert, denied 531 A.2d 935 (corporation took on de facto status
following dissolution so that debts belonged to corporation).
Appellants' reading of section 139 ironically defeats the very purpose of that section. As
appellants would have it, a suspended corporation no longer exists, thus merging the concept of
dissolution (following the winding up process) with suspension. Appellant's contend that a
suspended corporation may not enter into valid contracts. (Appellant's Brief at 7, citing 19 AM.
JUR.

2d

CORPORATIONS,

§ 2825 at 609-10). Appellants have confused de jure existence with

contractual liability. No one is claiming that CI is not liable under the agreement; having
executed the guarantee, CI is estopped to deny its corporate existence. See Morse, 508 P.2d 194;
Micciche, 727 P.2d at 371-72 (president of corporation not liable for obligations incurred during
corporate suspension).8 Cf. M&S Construction, 467 P.2d at 412 (corporation does not lose
capacity to maintain an action by reason of a suspension).
Corporate suspension is only a precursor to dissolution. Suspension is described in UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10-88.2.9 Nowhere in that provision is there even an inference that the
corporation's de jure status is forfeited during the suspension period. Moreover, the section
provides that "the corporation may remove the suspension by correcting the delinquency and
paying a reinstatement fee. . . ." Id. at § (2)(d). Thus, suspension is only life-threatening, not
life-ending. Contracts entered into by a suspended corporation are voidable by the other party,
8

Micciche made the salient point that "[i]f the legislature intended [the equivalent of section 139] to apply to an
officer of a validly formed but suspended corporation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have made its intent.
. . c l e a r . . . . " 727 P.2d at 372.
9
The last sentence in § 16-10-88.2(1) was added effective April 23, 1990, two years after CI was dissolved, and
thus does not affect this analysis.
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see, e.g., Baksay, 573 P.2d at 768; Kipski v. Bal Investment Co., 192 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Mich.
App. 1971) (corporation may not enforce contract entered into during suspension); Baldwin, 850
P.2d at 1193 (contract induced by mistake is voidable),10 but the suspension does not, by itself,
pierce the corporate veil and impose personal liability. There is nothing in section 88.2 to
support the notion that suspension triggers the personal liability of corporate officers and
directors.
CONCLUSION
Although correct on its merits, the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of
appellee Todd Crosland is not reviewable. The July 14, 1993 notice of appeal did not confer
jurisdiction on this court because the extension that allowed it to be filed was improvidently
granted. The trial court found that there was no excusable neglect for the failure to file, and that
was the only standard available to support the late filing. The appeal should, therefore, be
dismissed.
Should the court reach the merits, however, based on the undisputed fact that CI was a de
jure corporation, the trial court's application of section 139 was absolutely correct. Section 139
is simply not triggered when there is a certificate of incorporation. Appellants intended to
contract with a corporation and they did so. The fact that the corporation was unable to satisfy
the judgment does not constitute grounds for liability against the corporate officers and directors.
As a result, the trial court was correct, and the judgment in favor of appellee Todd Crosland
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

10

In Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1972), the court upheld the cancellation of a special land-use permit
because the purported corporate applicant had not been issued a certificate of incorporation.
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